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Buddhism 
In this article, I address divergent Buddhist positions on conceptual and non-conceptual 
understanding of reality and the process of transition from the former to the latter. My dis-
cussion is anchored in the context of a well-known problematic issue in the field of religious 
studies, namely, the question of (un)mediated mystical experience. Connecting uniquely 
Buddhist philosophical and contemplative perspectives with the questions debated in con-
temporary studies of mysticism, I argue that Buddhism can make significant contributions 
to that field. Not only does it provide refined models of mind, contemplative processes, and 
other elements that help us understand certain mystical experiences, but it also encourages 
us to rethink the very meaning of “mediation,” “ineffability,” “experience,” and other cate-
gories used in discussions of mysticism. The application of the category of mystical experi-
ence to Buddhist traditions thereby problematizes that category itself, simultaneously sug-
gesting new meanings and perspectives. Far from being passive objects of contemporary 
scholarly Euro-American discourse on this issue, Buddhist traditions can actively engage, 
challenge, and modify that discourse. 
Research into specificities of experiences, insights, and realizations articulated by Bud-
dhists themselves and interpreted from within the context of Buddhist worldviews and prac-
tices has much more to offer to the study of mysticism and mystical experiences than the one 
that starts with generalizations about mysticism across diverse religions grouped under such 
categories as “theistic,” “non-theistic,” and so forth. For example, most Buddhists would dis-
agree that such key Buddhist experiences as realization of ultimate reality and awakening 
or “enlightenment”1 are accessible to those who have not undergone specific types of Bud-
1
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2 Hereafter, for the Buddhist terms I will be providing only Sanskrit equivalents when such are available.
3 Hereafter, I am using the simplified phonetic transcription of Tibetan based on the usage adopted by 
the Tibetan and Himalayan Library. For details, see http://www.thlib.org/reference/transliteration  
4 This seminal thinker occupies a unique place in the intellectual history of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Work-
ing during one of the most formative but least explored periods in Tibetan history, he was deeply in-
volved in inter- and intrasectarian polemics of his time, and articulated a startlingly new reconsidera-
tion of the core areas of Buddhist thought and practice, such as epistemology, ethics, tantric rituals, and 
the relationship between philosophy and contemplation. One of the most complicated areas of Bud-
dhist thought explored by Shakya Chokden in minute detail is the nature and relationship of Yogācāra 
and Madhyamaka. I focus on it in my Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden’s New In-
terpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press), 
forthcoming in 2011. Hereafter, Visions of Unity. 
dhist training and conditioning. At the same time, they also agree on similarities or sameness 
of certain experiences across Buddhist traditions. That consensus in its turn is often interwo-
ven with fierce polemics against seeming flaws of Buddhist traditions disagreeing with one’s 
own in the areas of contemplation, identification of reality, results of meditative practice, and 
so forth. Studying these elements across Buddhist traditions and analyzing how Buddhists 
themselves approach such differences, similarities, uniqueness, and diversity will greatly 
contribute to a more nuanced overall understanding of mysticism and mystical experiences. 
In particular, I argue that if the category of “mystical experience” is applicable to Bud-
dhism at all, the direct realization of ultimate reality (Skt. paramārthasatya)2 or emptiness 
(Skt. śūnyatā) should be treated as one of the highest expressions of that experience in the 
Buddhist context because of its supreme soteriological value as the only direct antidote to 
impediments to awakening. Likewise, because that realization both transcends and destroys 
conceptuality, mundane mentality, and dualistic thinking, it best approximates the category 
of “unmediated mystical experience,” if such a category has any relevant use in the Bud-
dhist context. Correspondingly, because the process of direct realization of ultimate reality 
is one of the most challenging and important topics of Buddhist philosophical and contem-
plative theory and practice, the study of different approaches to accessing that realization di-
rectly bears upon and promises to contribute to the question of (un)mediated mystical ex-
perience. Therefore, although many elements involved in this polemical issue are uniquely 
Buddhist, their analysis can help us to achieve a better and more nuanced understanding of 
the issue of (un)mediated mystical experience. While only briefly addressing other forms of 
mystical experience in Buddhism, I will be targeting the issue of the process of realization 
of ultimate reality throughout this article. 
In what follows below, I first address the broader question of mystical experience in its 
connection to Buddhism, focusing primarily on two dimensions of the Buddhist worldview: 
nature of mind and Buddhist paths. This discussion forms a general background for the anal-
ysis of Buddhist approaches to the realization of ultimate reality. My analysis specifically 
targets the ecumenical approach developed by the seminal 15th century Tibetan thinker Ser-
dok Penchen Shakya Chokden (Tib. gser mdog paṇchen shākya mchog ldan, 1428–1507)3 
with respect to the two major rival systems of Mahāyāna Buddhism—Madhyamaka (Mid-
dle Way) and Yogācāra (Yogic Practice).4 I elaborate on his main argument that despite con-
tradictory worldviews, different types of contemplative conditioning leading to direct real-
ization of ultimate reality, and conflicting descriptions of that realization, followers of both 
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5 For the debate over this issue, see articles published in Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosoph-
ical Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), especially Katz’s “Language, Epistemology, 
and Mysticism” in the same volume, pp. 22–74 (hereafter, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism”); 
and Robert K.C. Forman (ed.), The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), especially Forman’s own “Introduction: Mysticism, Construc-
tivism, and Forgetting” in that volume, pp. 3–49 (hereafter, “Introduction”). For further details of For-
man’s arguments, see Robert K.C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (New York: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1999; hereafter Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness). For further details of Katz’s 
position, see Steven Katz, “The ‘Conservative’ Character of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticism and 
Religious Traditions, ed. Steven Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 3–60, and Steven 
Katz, “Mysticism and the Interpretation of sacred Scripture,” in Mysticism and Sacred Scripture, ed. 
Steven Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7–67. See also articles by contributors to the 
latter two volumes. For further references, see Forman’s Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, 2, 173–174. 
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra can access the same direct meditative experience of emptiness 
that is not mediated by any words and concepts at the time when it actually occurs. This ap-
proach is especially intriguing and heuristically useful, providing new perspectives on the 
nature of non-conceptual experience of ultimate reality and the role conceptual processes 
play in initially triggering and subsequently articulating that experience. I connect my anal-
ysis of Shakya Chokden’s position to the broader issue of how mediation might be involved 
in mystical experiences and the possibility of achieving the same mystical experience de-
spite different conditioning processes leading to it. 
My overall objective is to demonstrate that Buddhism offers highly advanced and sophis-
ticated tools for addressing mystical experiences that have no exact parallels in the non-Bud-
dhist discourse. Analysis and application of those tools will help better understand what issues 
related to mystical experience trouble Buddhist thinkers themselves and how they handle those 
issues. That in turn will result in a more nuanced and up-to-date understanding of the question 
of (un)mediated mystical experience addressed in contemporary scholarship on mysticism. 
Locating Buddhist mystical experiences
Multiplicity, contextuality, and the need for fine-tuning
The question regarding whether there can be (un)mediated mystical experience has long 
been troubling scholars of religious studies.5 This question is especially important to those 
who contest the possibility that followers of different religious traditions who have diverse 
backgrounds, follow different practices, and hold contradictory worldviews might achieve 
similar mystical experience(s). Claiming the possibility of unmediated mystical experience 
is important to those who believe in the existence of “religion” and “mysticism” as generic 
phenomena with definable characteristics, whose essence lies in personal experience, and 
whose manifestations are found in Buddhism, Christianity, and so forth. Denying this possi-
bility is crucial to those who question the applicability of such categories, as well as narra-
tives and theories designed for their explanation. 
Over the past 30 years, polemics about mediated and unmediated mystical experience be-
came heated, boiled, welled up, and spilled into the area of Buddhist thought and practice. 
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6 Similar to the study of “religion” as a separate field of inquiry, the topic of “mysticism” developed 
within the “Western” world. Partly because of that, when descriptions of mysticism are given, they are 
usually loaded with meanings, overtones, and agenda that are distinctly “Occidental” in character. The 
following statement by Robert Campany about religions is applicable to mysticism as well: “Discourse 
about religions is rooted in Western language communities and in the history of Western cultures… To 
speak of “religions” is to demarcate things in ways that are not inevitable or immutable but, rather, are 
contingent on the shape of Western history, thought, and institutions. Other cultures may, and do, lack 
closely equivalent demarcations.” “On the Very Idea of Religions (in the Modern West and in Early Me-
dieval China),” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 42, no. 4 (2003): 289. 
7 For a critique of the overemphasis by some modern Buddhist apologists on the role of experience in 
Buddhism, see Robert H. Sharf’s “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience,” 
Numen, vol. 42, no. 3 (1995): 228–283. But see also Janet Gyatso, “Healing Burns with Fire: The 
Facilitations of Experience in Tibetan Buddhism,” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
vol. 67, no. 1 (1999): 113–147 (hereafter, “Healing Burns with Fire”). Gyatso rightly observes that 
Sharf himself goes too far in his claim that the idea of unmediated meditative experience in Bud-
dhism came from the western mentors of modern Asian apologists (“Healing Burns with Fire,” 114), 
and in particular argues that his “claim that writing from personal experience is rare in Buddhism is 
also contravened by the Tibetan case” (ibid., 116). 
8 For example, Vasubandhu states in his celebrated Treasury of Higher Knowledge 
(Abhidharmakośakārikā): “The Teacher’s [i.e., the Buddha’s] holy Dharma is twofold: // [It has] the na-
ture of textual statements and realizations” (Skt. saddharmo dvividhaḥ śāsturāgamādhigamātmakaḥ). 
In Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī (ed.), The Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with 
Sphutārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomittrā, vol. 2 (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1998), 31 (hereaf-
ter, The Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya). From this perspective, all instances of the Buddhist path will be 
seen as realizations themselves or auxiliaries and results of those realizations. 
Both the attribution of “mystical” to “experience” and the emphasis on experience itself are 
problematic within the Buddhist context. Firstly, Buddhism lacks an equivalent of the term 
“mysticism.”6 Secondly, even in such allegedly “mystical” Buddhist cultures as Tibetan, the 
role of experience is less important than theories of mystical experience suggest.7 Overall, 
Buddhism emphasizes realizations/insights into reality and abandonments of obscurations8 
achieved through contemplation, ethical behavior, and ritual practice, while experience is 
assigned only secondary importance, usually as a by-product and indicator of the progress 
on the path. This is not to ignore the fact that Buddhists deal with multiple types of experi-
ences that can be or already have been termed “mystical” by scholars of mysticism. Care-
ful analysis of those experiences can greatly contribute to the broader field of religious stud-
ies. Nevertheless, if we do not want to turn mysticism into mystification, those experiences 
have to be handled with care and appreciated in their own right in terms of specific contex-
tual meanings, emphases, and objectives. Only if these conditions are fulfilled can “mysti-
cism” and “mystical experience” be released from the confines of quotation marks and ad-
dressed as if they were active and actual categories in Buddhism itself. 
The terms “mysticism” and “mystical experience” are vague, and are used differently 
in different contexts. Their applicability to Buddhism is particularly questionable: neither 
have they been meaningfully used for translating or clarifying any Buddhist terms or ideas, 
nor can they easily fit into any Buddhist categories or concepts. Because they do not match 
the Buddhist worldview, I do not attempt to define them or even to sketch out their general 
characteristics. Nevertheless, I also believe we can use the vagueness of the terms “mysti-
cism” and “mystical experience” to our advantage if our objective is to clarify the variety of 
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9 I agree with Robert Gimello, who suggests caution in handling Buddhist subjects related to mysticism 
and meditation, but also argues that scholars who apply such efforts will be rewarded: “Not only will 
they thereby increase their store of information, but they may also discover, embedded in the stud-
ied traditions themselves, new categories of interpretation, new criteria of judgment. These, in turn, 
may not only better suit their Asian subjects, but may also prove cross-culturally more useful than 
their counterparts of western origin. In the case of mysticism or the contemplative life this is particu-
larly to be anticipated.” See Robert M. Gimello, “Mysticism and Meditation,” in Mysticism and Phil-
osophical Analysis, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 179–180 (hereaf-
ter, “Mysticism and Meditation”). Gimello himself prefers to take mystical experience in the Buddhist 
context narrowly, arguing that mystical experience as it is commonly understood is limited only to a 
particular type of Buddhist meditation, such as practices of calming, and that the terms “mystical” and 
“mysticism” should be restricted to the states of śamatha and samādhi that Buddhists themselves dis-
tinguish from and subordinate to discernment or vipaśyanā. Ibid., 188 ff. 
10 For details, see Dakpo Tashi Namgyal, Mahāmudrā: The Moonlight―Quintessence of Mind and 
Meditation (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2006), 355 ff. (hereafter, Mahāmudrā). For the detailed 
analysis of this issue, see Janet Gyatso, “Healing Burns with Fire,” 117 ff. 
11 For example, when Shakya Chokden uses such terms as “definitive meaning experienced through 
meditation” (Tib. sgom pas nyams su myong bya’i nges don), he treats the direct realization of ulti-
mate reality as the experience of ultimate reality. (See note 66 for the full quotation.) 
phenomena these terms address rather than select only some phenomena as illustrations of 
limited definitions of the terms themselves.9 
Furthermore, the category of “experience” in Buddhism is very complex. Buddhists use 
several terms that can be translated as “experience” but have different meanings when dis-
cussed together or addressed in specific contexts. Only some of these terms have mean-
ings that overlap with the meaning of “realization,” and it is realization that is emphasized 
even in such “experience-oriented” systems as Mahāmudrā (Tib. phyag chen, Great Seal) 
and Dzokchen (Tib. rdzogs chen, Great Perfection). When one is encouraged to personally 
taste, experience, and realize different elements of Buddhist teachings, it is not the expe-
rience per se that is being emphasized, but the fact that one has to “interiorize” those ele-
ments or discover them “within” oneself instead of treating them merely as external objects 
of intellectual study. Therefore, we should not confuse these referents of “experience” with 
any of the specific experiences of bliss, non-conceptuality, etc., that Buddhists often warn 
against forming attachment to and do not treat as unique objectives of their practice. The 
Mahāmudrā system, for example, addresses different types of direct insights or realizations 
(Tib. rtogs pa) into the nature of mind that can be preceded or accompanied by experiences 
of bliss, clarity, and non-conceptuality (Tib. bde gsal mi rtog pa’i nyams), but are separate 
from and superior to them.10 (Throughout the paper I am using the terms “realization of ul-
timate reality” and “experience of ultimate reality” interchangeably, because in that particu-
lar case Buddhist thinkers themselves can understand the term “experience” (Tib. nyams su 
myong ba) as “realization”.11) 
Besides that, Buddhist thinkers and contemporary scholars of mysticism clearly pursue dif-
ferent objectives, have different interests, and operate within different conceptual frameworks. 
This is especially clear when we compare Buddhist approaches with those of the two prom-
inent adversaries on the issue of (un)mediated mystical experience, Steven Katz and Robert 
Forman. Katz’s position is best described in his own words: “There are NO pure (i.e., unme-
diated) experiences. Neither mystical experience nor more ordinary forms of experience give 
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12 “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism”, 26. (Emphasis is the author’s own.)
13 Ibid., 26–27.
14 Forman, “Introduction,” 5–7. In his Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness Forman has also included DMS 
(dualistic mystical state) into his study of mysticism. For further analysis and criticism of Forman’s 
PCE and DMS see Randall Studstill, The Unity of Mystical Traditions: The Transformations of Con-
sciousness in Tibetan and German Mysticism (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 26 ff. 
15 Ibid., 8.
16 Victor Sōgen Hori, “Kōan and Kenshō in the Rinzai Zen Curriculum,” in The Koan: Texts and Con-
texts in Zen Buddhism, ed. (Oxford University Press, 2000), 282, 310 note 4. (Hereafter, “Kōan and 
Kenshō in the Rinzai Zen Curriculum.”) 
17 Larry Short, “Mysticism, Mediation, and the Non-Linguistic,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, vol. 63, no. 4 (1995): 670. (Hereafter, “Mysticism, Mediation, and the Non-Linguistic.”) 
18 For a nuanced analysis of this debate, also described as the “constructivist-essentialist debate,” see 
Martin T. Adam, “A Post-Kantian Perspective on Recent Debates about Mystical Experience,” Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 70, no. 4 (2002): 801–817. Adam questions the appropriate-
ness of the experience / interpretation distinction that in his opinion presupposes the Kantian distinc-
tion between intuition and understanding, as well as noumenon and phenomenon. Victor Hori is also 
critical of this divide, approaching it from the Rinzai Zen perspective. He describes this divide as fol-
lows: “Katz and his opponents both agree in dividing the spectrum of consciousnesses into those with 
cognitive content and those without, into those that are mediated (not pure) and those that are unmed-
iated (pure). They both assume that these categories are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of 
all possibilities. They disagree only on whether there is or is not experience of pure consciousness” 
(“Kōan and Kenshō in the Rinzai Zen Curriculum,” 282–283.) According to Larry Short, the argument 
about unmediated, pure consciousness is based on a false dilemma, because both Forman and Katz, de-
spite their different approaches, restrict their discussion of mediation to the “sociolinguistic”; for ex-
ample, all of Katz’s samples consist of different sociolinguistic belief systems (“Mysticism, Mediation, 
and the Non-Linguistic,” 661, 663). Short himself argues against limiting mediation to just that, and 
suggests that overall mediation is “not an obstacle to experience, but its sine qua non, and not a barrier 
to understanding, but the process of understanding” (ibid., 664). 
any indication, or any grounds for believing, that they are unmediated.”12 Importantly, Katz 
adds that this process of mediation occurs during the experience itself, not only before or af-
ter.13 Forman, on the other hand, using Roland Fischer’s “cartography” of conscious states, 
splits them into ergotropic and trophotropic, and tends to reserve the term “mysticism” only 
for trophotropic states that are marked by low levels of cognitive and psychological activity.14 
He specifically focuses on the “pure consciousness event” (PCE), defining it as a “wakeful 
though contentless (nonintentional) consciousness,” and further identifying it with what Wal-
ter Stace called “introvertive mysticism,” distinguished from “extrovertive mysticism.”15 
Both Katz and Forman tend to address mystical experience in general, although they do 
limit it to examples that suit their respective agendas. As Victor Hori rightly observes, to 
support his claim that all cases of mystical experience are contextually constructed, Katz 
systematically chooses only those reported cases of mystical experience that have intellec-
tual content, while Forman never discusses reported cases of mystical experience that have 
much content. 16 Larry Short also points out that arguing for the existence of the pure con-
sciousness event, Forman, and those scholars who have joined him, attempt to “demon-
strate that mystical experience is epistemologically extraordinary (that is, an exception to 
the general rule that consciousness is mediated), as a way of establishing the possibility of 
a common core to mystical experience.”17 Nevertheless, contemporary scholarship dem-
onstrates that this divide itself is questionable.18 As soon will become apparent, Katz’s and 
Forman’s positions also cannot be easily applied to the Buddhist context. This is despite 
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19 See below. For the discussion of those states in the context of mystical experience, see Rob-
ert M. Gimello, :Mysticism and Meditation,” 170–199; Paul J. Griffiths, “Pure Consciousness and 
Indian Buddhism,” in The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. Robert 
K.C. Forman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 71–97 (hereafter, “Pure Consciousness and 
Indian Buddhism”). For a detailed description of mundane paths, see Lati Rinbochay and Denma Lo-
chö Rinbochay, Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1983); Geshe 
Gedün Lodrö, Calm Abiding and Special Insight (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1998); 
Florin Deleanu, The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukikamārga) in the Śrāvakabhūmi: A Trilin-
gual Edition (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Annotated Translation, and Introductory Study, Studia Phil-
ologica Buddhica Monograph Series XXa, vol. 1–2 (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist 
Studies, 2006); Longchen Rapjam (klong chen rab ’byams), Great Chariot: [Auto-]Commentary on 
the ‘Mind Nature Revitalization of the Great Perfection’ (Rdzogs pa chen po sems nyid ngal gso), vol. 
2 (California: Yeshe De Project, 1994), 190–200. (Hereafter, Great Chariot.) 
20 See, for example, Longchen Rapjam, Great Chariot, vol. 1, 277–279, 404–406. Forman’s accounts of 
PCE, for example, might agree with descriptions of certain meditative states accounted by Buddhist 
thinkers, but such states might be understood by those thinkers as mundane and not uniquely Bud-
dhist in character. As Zeff Bjerken rightly observes in “Echoes of the Tibetan Buddhist bSam yas De-
bate in Current Controversies over Mystical Experience,” The Tibet Journal, vol . 29, no. 4 (2004): 7, 
“[t]he “empirical” accounts of the PCE recorded by Forman, including his own autobiographical re-
port, might be criticized by Kamalaśīla as blank states of pure calm (śamatha), which may be peace-
ful but they do not effect liberation.” 
21 Note that in contrast to some non-Buddhist thinkers for whom non-mediation by words and concepts 
is only a small part of what might constitute mediation, most Buddhist thinkers treat such categories 
as time, space, subject-object intentionality, etc., as conceptually constructed. Demonstrating that a 
certain experience is not mediated by concepts will therefore automatically exclude it from being me-
diated by time, space, and other such constructs. 
the fact that Buddhists do face similar problems in their approaches to what can be called 
“mystical experience.” 
Study of the tools and strategies used in Buddhist approaches to those problems and 
issues can significantly refine, expand, and modify contemporary debates about mysti-
cal experience. Similar to followers of other religious traditions, Buddhists emphasize the 
uniqueness of their practices and realizations, as well as their results, such as nirvāṇa. 
This being said, they also accommodate varieties of meditative states under the category 
of “mundane paths” (Skt. laukikamārga),19 thinking that those states are shared in com-
mon by Buddhist and non-Buddhist contemplatives. Arguing that one does not have to be 
a Buddhist to experience “infinite consciousness” (Skt. vijñānānatya), “nothingness” (Skt. 
akiṃcanya), and other states subsumed under that category, Buddhist thinkers show their 
insufficiency for attaining uniquely Buddhist objectives, and warn against confusing such 
states and uniquely Buddhist meditative states.20 Most importantly, Buddhist thinkers ap-
proach the question of mediation differently than either Katz or Forman: while the two 
scholars debate about the very possibility of unmediated mystical experience, the major-
ity of Buddhist thinkers take for granted that certain states―such as the direct realization 
of ultimate reality and the omniscience of buddhahood―are not mediated by any concep-
tual images or verbal constructs at the time of their occurrence.21 This is despite the fact 
that they are necessarily mediated through specific Buddhist practices that precede them, 
and in cases other than buddhahood are also limited to realizing only some “parts” of real-
ity. Buddhist thinkers also disagree on the question of whether the direct realization of ul-
timate reality has “content” and images, and involves mental processes. Therefore, Bud-
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22 In this paper, I am taking the terms “mind” and “mental states” broadly, referring to all types of men-
tal processes, including those that are given names of wisdom, primordial mind, non-dual wisdom, 
etc., as well as those that according to some thinkers transcend mind. 
23 Not all mystical experiences in Buddhism are directly related to Buddhist path structures: different 
types of pure visions, revelations, dawning of the clear light of death, postmortem visions of Bud-
dhist divinities, etc., are not necessarily related to such structures, at least not explicitly. Neverthe-
less, paths to awakening are given in Buddhism more attention than in any other religion, and their 
analysis can make contributions to the studies of non-Buddhist religions as well. As Robert Buswell 
and Robert Gimello put it, “… we think that, as a potentially cross-cultural category for the study of 
religions, the concept of ‘the path’ has been given in Buddhism an explication more sustained, com-
prehensive, critical, and sophisticated than that provided by any other single religious tradition.” 
Robert E. Buswell and Robert M. Gimello, “Introduction,” in Paths to Liberation: The Mārga and 
Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought, ed. Robert E. Buswell and Robert M. Gimello (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1992), 2. 
dhists themselves hold divergent views on the meaning and process of mediation involved 
in mystical experiences. 
These and other elements addressed below call for a more nuanced understanding of 
what Buddhists themselves believe to be common and uncommon experiences that can be 
termed “mystical,” and how they understand the nature of those experiences. If we want the 
Buddhist approach to mystical experiences to be relevant to our discussion, it is important 
to make our discussion of mystical experiences relevant to Buddhism. In particular, we can 
greatly clarify the question of (un)mediated mystical experience in connection to Buddhism 
if we let Buddhist thinkers speak for themselves. They believe that Buddhist mystical expe-
riences are conditioned by specifically Buddhist types of training. If we take those claims 
seriously, we have to shift our emphasis from the question of unmediated mystical experi-
ence per se to conditioning processes that precede and trigger it. Our question in that con-
text will be to ask whether different conditionings necessarily lead to the same or different 
mystical experiences. 
Similar to other religious traditions, in the Buddhist world, mystical experiences com-
prise a part of interwoven combinations of different elements or dimensions, such as epis-
temological models of conceptual and non-conceptual states of mind, models of the path to 
awakening, diverse cosmological models, distinctions between “esoteric” and “exoteric” el-
ements, bodily transformations, and so forth. To fully appreciate Buddhist mystical experi-
ences, therefore, it is crucial to consider all such related elements instead of just picking and 
choosing. Some dimensions necessarily play a more important role in particular mystical ex-
periences than others. Due to limitations of this paper, I will focus on two such dimensions 
that are virtually ubiquitous throughout the Buddhist world and are particularly important in 
the present context: the dimension of mind22 structure and processes, and the dimension of 
the Buddhist paths (Skt. mārga). The former is indispensable for understanding how Bud-
dhists themselves view mental processes involved in mystical experiences, while the latter 
is crucial for understanding what those experiences are embedded in, shaped by, limited to, 
and what role they play within the broader framework of Buddhist views and practices.23 
The two dimensions are also interrelated, overlap, and cannot be treated in separation from 
each other: Buddhist paths are understood primarily as progressive mental states, while the 
majority of mental transformations related to mystical experiences, visions, and realizations 
in Buddhism can be understood only in the context of Buddhist paths. 
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24 See, for example, Vasubandhu’s Thirty Stanzas (Triṃśikākārikā), in Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenom-
enology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih Lun (Lon-
don: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 276 ff., and the second chapter of his Treasury of Higher Knowledge 
(Abhidharmakośakārikā), in Swāmī Dwārikādās Śāstrī (ed.), The Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya, 24 ff. 
See also Hsüan-tsang, Demonstration of Consciousness Only in Three Texts on Consciousness Only, 
translated by Francis H. Cook (Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 
1999), 158 ff. (Hereafter, Demonstration of Consciousness Only). 
25 For details, see Hsüan-tsang, Demonstration of Consciousness Only, 68 ff. 
26 Ibid., 60 ff. See also Griffiths, “Pure Consciousness and Indian Buddhism,” 84.
The following short surveys of the Buddhist mind and path models are intended to intro-
duce unfamiliar readers to the complexity of those models and demonstrate their close re-
lationship with Buddhist experiences and realizations. This in turn will put into question 
the applicability to Buddhism of such foreign ideas and categories as Forman’s category 
of contentless consciousness or Katz’s assumption that all our experiences are necessarily 
constructed and mediated. Discussion of those models will also provide a necessary back-
ground and context for analyzing the interpretive approach of Shakya Chokden that will be 
given below. My overall objective is not to defend one particular model over another but to 
demonstrate their multiplicity and the indispensability of paying close attention to and uti-
lizing specific Buddhist models when analyzing specific Buddhist mystical experiences, es-
pecially when those models are designed for not only explaining but in fact also leading to 
those experiences. 
Mind models
Buddhists developed highly sophisticated models of the mind’s structure and function-
ing, and use them in discussions of realizations of reality, meditative states, progress on the 
path, exalted visions, and awakening. 
Mind in Buddhism is treated not as a reservoir containing thoughts and feelings, but 
rather as a framework of interrelated processes and mental states. The most common model 
is the twofold division of mind into cognitive states (Skt. citta) and mental factors (Skt. 
caitta). Cognitive states are usually subdivided into six―five sensory (Skt. indriyajñāna) 
and one mental consciousness (Skt. manojñāna)―or eight, adding the afflicted mentality 
(Skt. kliṣtamanas) and storehouse consciousness (Skt. ālayavijñāna), as is usually done by 
Yogācāra thinkers. Mental factors are divided into 49, 51, etc., and further grouped into 
clusters, such as the 5 omnipresent mental factors (Skt. sarvatraga), 11 virtuous mental fac-
tors (Skt. kuśala), and so forth.24 Similar to the other seven types of consciousness, store-
house consciousness is always accompanied by the five omnipresent mental factors: mental 
contact (Skt. sparśa), attention (Skt. manaskāra), feeling (Skt. vedanā), discrimination (Skt. 
saṃjñā), and intention (Skt. cetanā).25 Also, similar to other cognitive acts and mental fac-
tors, even the storehouse consciousness has objects of perception (Skt. ālambana), such as 
the external world.26 
These models are used to describe all unenlightened and enlightened states of mind, or 
limited to unenlightened states only. In the latter case, new elements can be added, such as 
the stainless consciousness (Skt. amalavijñāna), primordial mind (Skt. jñāna), primordial 
mind of luminosity (Skt. prabhāsvarajñāna), and buddha-essence (Skt. buddhagarbha). 
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27 One such thinker is Shakya Chokden who describes the primordial mind interchangeably as self-cog-
nition (Tib. rang rig, Skt. svasaṃvedana) and individually self-cognizing primordial mind (Tib. so 
so(r) rang gis rig pa’i ye shes). For details, see my Visions of Unity, Chap. 4, Sect. 1 and Chap. 5, 
Sect. 3. For a relevant analysis of self-cognition, see Zhihua Yao, The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cogni-
tion (London: Routledge, 2005), especially 121 ff. 
28 For details, see Hsüan-tsang, Demonstration of Consciousness Only, 78–81. 
29 For details, see ibid., 139–140.
30 For details, see Lati Rinbochay and Jeffrey Hopkins, Death, Intermediate State and Rebirth in Tibetan 
Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1985). On how that process is incorporated into tant-
ric practice, see Daniel Cozort, Highest Yoga Tantra: An Introduction to the Esoteric Buddhism of Ti-
bet (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1986; hereafter, Highest Yoga Tantra), and Yangchen 
Gawai Lodoe, Paths and Grounds of Guhyasamaja (Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and 
Archives, 1995; hereafter Paths and Grounds of Guhyasamaja). 
Those elements then can be treated as becoming active/manifest during direct realizations of 
reality, buddhahood, and other circumstances when obscurations subside either temporarily 
or forever. In that context, some thinkers might take the primordial mind as self-cognizing 
and perceiving nothing else but the primordial mind itself.27 When no extra mental catego-
ries are added, or when they are subsumed under one of the six-fold or eight-fold categories, 
it might either be argued that realization of ultimate reality and awakening are performed by 
those cognitive states and mental factors, or are devoid of any mental states whatsoever and 
utterly inexpressible. 
According to some thinkers, certain mental states last throughout lifetimes and can even 
continue into the state of buddhahood, while others are more short lived and disappear at a 
certain point either temporarily or forever. For example, according to Yogācāra, the store-
house consciousness persists continuously and perishes in the state of nirvāṇa28; the af-
flicted mentality temporarily ceases in a particular state of cessation (Skt. nirodhasamāpatti) 
and during direct realization of ultimate reality prior to nirvāṇa, and is completely eradi-
cated in the state of an arhat.29 
Buddhist thinkers also provide dynamic models of mental states as unfolding pro-
cesses. According to some Buddhist tantric systems, for example, worldly deluded states 
of consciousness develop on the basis of the primordially pure state of luminosity (Skt. 
prabhāsvara), fundamental innate luminous mind (Tib. gnyug ma lhan cig skyes pa’i ’od 
gsal gyi sems), and in the process of dying the order is reversed: all types of conscious-
ness, including the storehouse consciousness, undergo successive stages of dissolution and 
vanish back into the basic luminosity at the moment of death just to reemerge again in the 
postmortem state. Tantric teachings provide elaborate descriptions of these processes with 
accompanying visions, and creatively incorporate them into contemplative practices.30 
Likewise, some systems―such as the Chinese Hua-yen advocated by the Ch’an/Hua-yen 
thinker Kuei-feng Tsung-mi (780–841) and the “Quintessential Instructions” division (Tib. 
man ngag sde) of Tibetan Dzokchen advocated by Longchen Rapjam (Tib. klong chen rab 
’byams, 1308–1364) and later elaborated upon by Jikmé Lingpa (Tib. ’jigs med gling pa, 
1730–1798)―describe the basic reality as awareness (Ch. chih, Tib. rig pa), emphasize the 
dynamic nature of reality, and embrace the teaching of the nature-origination (Ch. hsing-
ch’i) or nature-manifestation (Tib. gzhi snang) that bridges the gap between ultimate real-
ity and phenomenal appearances, treating the latter as manifestations of the primordial na-
ture due to its functioning (Ch. yung, Tib. rtsal). According to Dzokchen, awareness―also 
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31 For details, see Peter N. Gregory, Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity: An Annotated Translation of 
Tsung-mi’s Yüan jen lun with a Modern Commentary (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 
152–3, 179; and Sam Van Schaik, Approaching the Great Perfection: Simultaneous and Gradual 
Methods of Dzogchen Practice in the Longchen Nyingtig (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 51. 
(Hereafter, Approaching the Great Perfection.) For a detailed discussion of the dynamic development 
of different states of mind from the primordial base and their subsequent dissolution, as well as the 
nature and functioning of those mental states, see Longchen Rapjam’s Great Chariot, vol. 1, 145–
174, 250–287. Note that despite some similarities in terminology and ideas, Hua-yen and Dzokchen 
systems are embedded in different cultural, historical, ritual, philosophical, and contemplative con-
texts that are not just non-responsive containers but rather active shapers of those systems. For ex-
ample, despite its rhetoric of spontaneity and transcendence of “artificialities” of Tantra, Dzokchen 
is embedded in the tantric culture (although it is a question whether it always has been so), and the 
above mind model is only one part of the broader web of ideas and practices, such as unique Dzo-
kchen preliminaries, visions of the Leap Over (Tib. thod rgal) stage, attainment of several types of 
Rainbow Body (Tib. ’ja’ lus), and so forth, that do not exist in the Hua-yen system. 
32 One should not be misled by such examples scattered throughout Buddhist texts as an empty cave 
with thieves entering and exiting without finding anything inside (the example of a contemplative 
mind dissociated from occasional concepts that arise and subside by themselves), clear water with lit-
tle fish frolicking within without agitating it (the example of maintaining one-pointed concentration 
while engaging in subtle analysis), and so forth. After all, these are just illustrations used for clarify-
ing certain aspects of those contemplative states, not descriptions of their nature. Furthermore, the 
first example does not suggest that the cave is a reservoir of thieves. Nor does the second example 
suggest that similar to water containing fish one-pointed concentration somehow contains subtle anal-
ysis. All it points at is their mutually unobstructive union. 
33 See for example, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Thaye, Creation and Completion: Essential points of Tant-
ric Meditation (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1996), 51–61 (hereafter, Creation and Completion). 
called “fundamental mind” (Tib. gnyug sems)―forms the basis for all the eight types of 
consciousness mentioned above, and its realization cannot be performed by any other con-
sciousness than that awareness itself. This fundamental awareness is also called “ground” 
(Tib. gzhi), because all impure and pure, enlightened states of consciousness arise from it 
due to its dynamic functioning.31 
I should note that although the ground, awareness, and luminosity provide for and serve 
as the basis of the arising of phenomenal appearances, they do not contain them. Otherwise, 
we would have to accept an absurd possibility of the non-dualistic non-conceptual state of 
mind containing dualistic concepts, non-afflicted state having afflictions, etc. Because, as 
has been mentioned above, Buddhist thinkers do not treat mind as a thought container, the 
idea of emptying mind of its contents is hardly acceptable in the Buddhist context.32 It is 
more fruitful, therefore, to pay attention to what state ceases, what state persists, and at what 
level specific realizations and experiences occur. This adds an additional weight to distinc-
tions between different types and levels of consciousness. 
Certain models of mind can add new significance to philosophical and contemplative 
systems when these models are combined with each other. Yogācāra terminology of the 
eight types of consciousness, for example, can be carried into highly elaborate tantric sys-
tems and used as an aid in making subtle distinctions between different levels of con-
sciousness utilized in tantric contemplative practice.33 Alternatively, it can be argued that 
because of divergent interpretations of mind in different systems, their practices and re-
sults of those practices are also vastly different. For example, it is often argued that tantric 
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34 See, for example, Daniel Cozort, Highest Yoga Tantra, 21 ff. 
35 For details, see Jeffrey Hopkins (trans. and ed.), Fundamental Mind: The Nyingma View of the Great 
Completeness by Mi-pam-gya-tso, Commentary by Khetsun Sangpo Rinbochay (Ithaca, New York: 
Snow Lion Publications, 2006), 39. See also Jamgön Kongtrul, Creation and Completion, 67 ff. 
36 Peter Gregory, “Sudden Enlightenment Followed by Gradual Cultivation: Tsung-mi’s Analysis 
of Mind,” in Peter Gregory (ed.), Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese 
Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 298 ff. Hereafter, “Sudden Enlightenment 
Followed by Gradual Cultivation.” 
37 See Anne Carolyn Klein and Geshe Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche, Unbounded Wholeness: Dzogchen, 
Bon, and the Logic of the Nonconceptual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10, note 17 for 
discussion and further references related to the problems involved in translation of this term. 
38 Dharmakīrti uses different levels of analysis wherein the status of those representations and the 
process of perception in general are interpreted differently. See John Dunne, Foundations of 
Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004), 53–144, especially 53–79, 100–112. 
39 See, for example, my Visions of Unity, Chap. 4, Sect. 1. 
40 John Dunne, “Realizing the Unreal: Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Yogic Perception,” Journal of Indian 
Philosophy, vol. 34, no. 6 (December 2006): 514. Hereafter, “Realizing the Unreal.” 
practice is highly efficient and swift because it teaches and utilizes subtle and powerful 
levels of consciousness that are even unheard of in non-tantric systems.34 Dzokchen med-
itation is built on making a sharp distinction between the fundamental mind of awareness 
and other types of consciousness, and then utilizing the former in contemplative prac-
tice.35 Kuei-feng Tsung-mi’s argument for the superiority of the Ho-tse school of Ch’an’s 
practice is based on his claim that in contrast to Northern and Hung-chou Ch’an lineages, 
it teaches awakening to both static and dynamic aspects of mind followed by their culti-
vation in contemplative practice.36 
One distinction that is particularly helpful for understanding Buddhist approaches to 
mystical experiences―and specifically to the direct realization of ultimate reality―is the 
distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual types of mind. Although concepts and 
the lack thereof are understood by Buddhist thinkers differently, interpretive approaches in-
spired by the ideas of the famous Indian Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–670 C.E.) 
assumed a place of paramount importance in the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist world. Ac-
cording to Tibetan interpreters of his system, conceptuality (Skt. kalpanā) is understood as 
a state of mind that cognizes its objects via their generic images or meaning-universals (Skt. 
arthasāmānya),37 while non-conceptual direct perception (Skt. pratyakṣa) perceives its ob-
jects directly, without the media of those meaning-universals. Nevertheless, both conceptual 
and non-conceptual states of mind cognize their objects via “representations” (Skt. ākāra), 
i.e., images of perceived things, which can be likened to reflections (representations) on the 
surface of a mirror (mind). The ontological status of those representations is understood dif-
ferently even within the same Dharmakīrtean system,38 not to mention their different inter-
pretations by subsequent thinkers.39 
Dharmakīrti describes the transition from conceptual to non-conceptual understand-
ing as follows: “… that to which one meditatively conditions oneself, whether it be real 
or unreal, will result in a clear, non-conceptual cognition when the meditation is per-
fected.”40 This very model is applied by Indian and Tibetan thinkers to conceptual and non-
conceptual realization of reality and the process of transition from the former to the lat-
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41 For example, as The Fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso puts it: “With respect to a non-conceptual 
wisdom that apprehends a profound emptiness, one first cultivates a conceptual consciousness that 
apprehends an emptiness, and when a clear perception of the object of meditation arises, this becomes 
a non-conceptual wisdom. Moreover, the initial generation of that conceptual consciousness must de-
pend solely on a correct reasoning. Fundamentally, therefore, this process traces back solely to a rea-
soning, which itself must fundamentally trace back to valid experiences common to ourselves and 
others.” Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, The Key to the Middle Way: A Treatise on the Re-
alization of Emptiness, in Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, The Buddhism of Tibet (Ithaca, 
New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), 55–56. 
42 As Dunne puts it, “Dharmakīrti does not choose to present yogic perception as a mystical gnosis that 
encounters or uncovers real things in the world; instead, he presents it as a process that is designed to 
inculcate transformative concepts into the mind through an intense, vivid and nonconceptual experi-
ence that arises from learning, contemplating and meditating on those concepts.” Dunne, “Realizing 
the Unreal,” 500. 
43 Ibid., 507.
44 See the section on Shakya Chokden’s approach to Yogācāra and Madhyamaka.
45 Katz, “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” 46–47. 
46 See my “Encountering Ineffability—Counting Ineffability: On Divergent Verbalizations of the Ineffa-
ble in 15th Century Tibet,” in Acta Tibetica et Buddhica, vol. 1 (2008): 1–15. 
47 See also Griffiths, “Pure Consciousness and Indian Buddhism,” 85–90, for the discussion of non-con-
ceptual realization of the ultimate (Griffiths calls such a state of mind “unconstructed awareness”). 
ter.41 This process, nevertheless, is understood by Buddhist thinkers differently. Recently, 
John Dunne argued that Dharmakīrti himself did not view the transition from conceptual 
to non-conceptual realization of reality as some sort of a break through the veil of con-
cepts to a mystical gnosis that experiences reality lying beyond concepts, but rather as a 
transition from conceptual understanding to a non-conceptual experience of the four noble 
truths.42 In Dharmakīrti’s system, this process involves the sequence of cognitions induced 
initially by learning, then by contemplating, and finally by meditating (Skt. śrutamaya-, 
cintāmaya-, and bhāvanāmayajñāna).”43 In contrast to that position, later Tibetan interpret-
ers of Dharmakīrti’s thought and other systems to which that thought was adopted often 
saw the transition from conceptual to non-conceptual realization of reality precisely as a 
break through conceptuality to the inconceivable and ineffable ultimate reality underlying 
and hidden beyond concepts.44 
It is also true that virtually all Mahāyāna thinkers treat the highest ultimate reality and its 
direct realization as ineffable and transcending words and concepts. Nevertheless, the ineffa-
bility of the ultimate implies neither its similarity across different systems nor its accessibility. 
As some critics rightly observed, interpreters of mysticism can be misled by similar-sounding 
descriptions of mystical experience as ineffable, inexpressible, transcendent, sublime, and so 
forth.45 As I have recently argued, even within one and the same Buddhist culture, such as Ti-
betan, in the context of discussion of the same system, such as Madhyamaka, Buddhist think-
ers offer multiple and contradictory interpretations of ineffable ultimate reality.46 As I will 
demonstrate below, Buddhist thinkers also conceive different ways of accessing the ultimate. 
Likewise, the direct realization of ultimate reality can be described as perceiving “something” 
or having no object at all.47 Because the direct realization of ultimate reality occupies the place 
of paramount importance in Buddhism, it comes as no surprise that Buddhist thinkers tend to 
argue that such interpretations do not just describe the same reality in different ways, but actu-
14   Y.  K o m a r o v s K i  i n  S o p h i a  (2011)
48 For details, see Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations (New York: Routledge, 
1989), 204 ff. by Paul Williams whose discussion is primarily based on the Sūtra on the Grounds 
(Daśabhūmikasūtra). See also Longchen Rapjam, Great Chariot, vol. 1, 521–538, and vol. 2, 
202–241. 
49 See Eugene Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Calcutta Oriental Series, no. 27 (Lon-
don: Luzac & Co., 1936), 149–178. Obermiller translates them as “appliances.” 
ally shape mental processes in such a way that some of them can grant access to direct realiza-
tion of that reality while others, being wrong and misleading, only obscure it. 
Buddhist paths
The above discussion makes it clear that distinctions between different types and lev-
els of mind are indispensable for understanding diverse approaches to meditation, prog-
ress in Buddhist practice, and by extension mystical experiences, because these distinctions 
directly bear upon such questions as what state of consciousness is used in what type of 
practice, how different mental states condition each other, and what experiences they trig-
ger. Nevertheless, because mystical experiences in Buddhism for the most part are treated 
as results and stages of Buddhist practices, their discussion will remain overly vague and 
general unless placed within the framework of those practices. Buddhist practices in turn 
are often understood in terms of models of the path to awakening, such as the “five paths” 
(Skt. pañcamārga) model. Mahāyāna thinkers further add to it the “ten grounds” (Skt. 
daśabhūmi), thereby issuing the model of “ten grounds-five paths” and presenting all of 
them as progressive stages of the path to buddhahood. 
According to this model, one starts from the path of accumulation (Skt. saṃbhāramārga), 
moves on to the path of preparation (Skt. prayogamārga), and when for the first time 
one directly realizes the ultimate reality of all phenomena, one enters the path of see-
ing (Skt. darśanamārga) and the first bodhisattva ground, and becomes a Mahāyāna 
ārya or a “noble”/“exalted” being. One keeps practicing on the path of meditation (Skt. 
bhāvanāmārga) that covers bodhisattva grounds 2–10 and finally achieves the path of no 
more learning (Skt. aśaikṣamārga), i.e., the state of buddhahood. Each of the ten grounds 
consists of a state of absorption in meditative equipoise (Skt. samāhita), when one directly 
realizes ultimate reality, and a state not in absorption, known as subsequent attainment (Skt. 
pṛṣṭhalabdha), when one engages in other bodhisattva practices.48 Every transition from one 
ground to the next is necessarily conditioned by specific practices of the preceding ground 
known as “trainings” or “applications” (Skt. parikarman).49 According to the non-tantric 
Mahāyāna teachings, it takes at least three countless eons to cover all the five paths, requir-
ing one countless eon to cover paths 1–2, one countless eon to cover grounds 1–7, and one 
more countless eon to cover grounds 8–10. 
This model explains when and why certain mystical experiences are believed to happen. 
The direct realization of ultimate reality can happen only during meditative equipoise on the 
path of seeing, meditation, and no more learning, and has to be preceded by a long process 
of conceptual contemplation of emptiness and other practices. At the very beginning of sub-
sequent attainment that immediately follows most meditative equipoises, one experiences 
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50 See Eugene Obermiller, Prajñāpāramitā in Tibetan Buddhism (New Delhi: Paljor Publications, 1998), 
13–54. 
51 See Karl Brunnhölzl (tr. and introduction), In Praise of Dharmadhātu by Nāgārjuna, Commentary by 
the Third Karmapa (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2007), 126, 273 ff. 
52 See, for example, Longchen Rapjam, Good Chariot: [Auto-]Commentary on the ‘Illusion Revitaliza-
tion of the Great Perfection’ (Rdzogs pa chen po sgyu ma ngal gso’i ’grel ba shing rta bzang po, Cal-
ifornia: Yeshe De Project, 1994), 221–236. 
53 See Sam Van Schaik, Approaching the Great Perfection, 124–127. See also Dakpo Tashi Namgyal, 
Mahāmudrā, 408–415. 
the illusion-like meditative stabilization (Skt. māyopamāsamadhi) when conventional phe-
nomena appear just as illusions, this experience being colored by the immediately preced-
ing realization of emptiness. Besides this experience, subsequent attainments also contain 
multiple visions and experiences that can be termed “mystical” in the ecstatic sense: on each 
ground one sees an increasing number of buddhas, travels to an increasing number of pure 
lands, enters an increasing number of meditative absorptions, and so forth. 
Buddhist path models also make it clear that despite similar terminology of “ultimate re-
ality,” “selflessness,” and “emptiness,” those terms have different referents in the context 
of specific paths, and can be applied to objects of yogic direct perception on the paths of 
śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas (the latter being the Mahāyāna path described 
above, the former two being non-Mahāyāna paths to arhatship). Buddhist thinkers often em-
phasize the hierarchy of direct realizations of emptiness and claim that only Mahāyāna āryas 
can realize ultimate reality fully, while śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are able to realize it 
only partially.50 Furthermore, during each of the ten grounds on the same Mahāyāna path, 
one acquires increasingly extensive visions of reality, similar to seeing the waxing moon.51 
This is not to say that the mind and path models addressed above can be universally ap-
plied to all kinds of Buddhist mystical experiences. On the contrary, those models and their 
combinations themselves require tuning and reconsideration when applied to specific con-
texts. For example, when it is claimed that one can directly realize ultimate reality only 
starting from the level of ārya bodhisattvas that begins from the path of seeing, it follows 
that virtually no living Mahāyāna practitioners can claim to have realized ultimate real-
ity directly. Otherwise, they would also have to claim that they have been practicing the 
Mahāyāna path in previous lives for at least one countless eon, can see at least a hundred 
buddhas, shake at least a hundred world realms, and so forth. On the other hand, follow-
ers of Dzokchen and Mahāmudrā systems repeatedly emphasize that from the very begin-
ning of practice one has to be introduced and exposed to the ultimate nature of mind di-
rectly, and that even this initial realization is non-conceptual.52 But in the context of the 
ten grounds-five paths model this position raises the problems just mentioned above. In at-
tempts to resolve such problems while retaining the ten grounds-five paths model, some 
Dzokchen and Mahāmudrā thinkers resorted to ideas of acquiring the not-yet-manifest po-
tential to meet a hundred buddhas, shake a hundred realms, etc., that can be achieved in this 
very life but manifest after death when the “shell” of the body is finally broken, similar to 
a mighty mythical bird garuda whose powers are complete within the egg even before it 
hatches.53 But such interpretations are far from being universally accepted even within the 
Tibetan Buddhist world. 
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54 Peter Gregory, “Sudden Enlightenment Followed by Gradual Cultivation,” 279–313, especially 285.
55 For the analysis of the tantric path model of the Guhyasamāja system, see Christian K. Wede-
meyer, Āryadeva’s Lamp that Integrates the Practices (Caryāmelāpakapradīpa): The Gradual Path of 
Vajrayāna Buddhism According to the Esoteric Community Noble Tradition (New York: The Ameri-
can Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2007), especially 63–120. On how it matches with the ten grounds-
five paths model, see Yangchen Gawai Lodoe, Paths and Grounds of Guhyasamaja, 106 ff. 
56 For example, in his Zen and the Taming of the Bull: Towards the Definition of Buddhist Thought 
(London: Gordon Fraser, 1978), 15 ff., Walpola Rahula finds multiple parallels between Zen and 
Theravāda views and practices. 
57 I should note in passing that a lot of confusion was created by the term “enlightenment” and its care-
less application to diverse Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems. I am using “awakening” throughout 
this paper, partly in order to avoid confusion and partly because “awakening” approximates “bodhi” 
much better than “enlightenment.” It is interesting to note that the term “enlightenment” was first ap-
plied to the Buddhist context by T.W. Rhys Davids (1843–1922), a Pali scholar and founder of the 
Pali Text Society. Rhys Davids translated “bodhi” as “Enlightenment” apparently wishing to associ-
ate the knowledge acquired by the Buddha with the knowledge of the European Enlightenment. See 
Judith Snodgrass, Presenting Japanese Buddhism to the West: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and the 
Columbian Exposition (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 
106–107. 
58 Technically speaking buddhas are arhats as well, but the term “arhat” nowadays is usually applied by 
Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhists to those who achieved nirvāṇa but did not develop many other 
exalted qualities attributed to buddhas only. 
Furthermore, in spite of the popularity of the ten grounds-five paths model and the fact 
that many Buddhist writers feel obliged to refer to it in order to contextualize and authen-
ticate views and practices they address, this is not the only model of the path. Kuei-feng 
Tsung-mi, for example, does not make reference to this model but uses his own model. He 
locates his approach to the path in the context of the three types of awakening―intrinsic 
awakening (Ch. pen-chüeh), awakening of initial insight (Ch. chieh-wu) characterized as 
sudden awakening (Ch. tun-wu), and awakening of complete realization (Ch. cheng-wu)―
and argues that genuine practice of the path starts with the awakening of initial insight only. 
Because he sees that awakening as sudden, he clearly does not feel that preparatory prac-
tices, such as those of the paths preceding the path of seeing in the ten grounds-five paths 
model, are necessary.54 
Understanding which path models are implied in case of particular mystical experiences 
helps clear away a lot of confusion created by drawing overly generalized parallels not only 
between Buddhist and non-Buddhist mystical experiences, but also between mystical expe-
riences addressed within different Buddhist traditions. 55 For example, despite the fact that 
some Ch’an/Zen and Theravāda thinkers describe awakening as the goal of practice and as 
sudden, 56 what is signified by “awakening” and “suddenness” can be vastly different de-
pending on context. The awakening or “enlightenment” (Pali/Skt. bodhi) 57 most Theravāda 
followers are striving for is understood as nirvāṇa of an arhat other than a buddha,58 while 
buddhahood is reserved only for outstanding individuals, such as the Buddha Śākyamuni. 
Such an arhatship is the fifth within the five paths that are not linked with bodhisattva prac-
tices as those are understood in Mahāyāna. Descriptions of Ch’an/Zen awakening, depend-
ing on context, might bypass the five path model or be embedded in it, but being a part of 
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the Mahāyāna tradition, Ch’an/Zen is necessarily linked with bodhisattva practices. Sud-
denness of an arhat’s awakening mentioned in Theravāda texts means that sometimes such 
awakening happens unexpectedly, although it necessarily has to be preceded by years and 
sometimes lives dedicated to contemplative practice. In contrast, in the Ch’an/Zen―as in 
the case of the above-mentioned Tsung-mi’s model―suddenness implies that no artificial 
conditioning can trigger initial awakening (although it does not imply that awakening just 
happens out of the blue). 
What emerges from this discussion is that the issues of mediation, objects, and pro-
cesses involved in mystical experiences are treated differently by Buddhist thinkers and 
assume various meanings in diverse contexts. According to the model of the six or eight 
types of consciousness and accompanying mental factors, mind always has certain ob-
jects of perception, and therefore no state of consciousness can be completely free from 
any objects and processes. Notice that even the above-mentioned states of “limitless con-
sciousness” or “nothingness” are otherwise accompanied by more than a dozen mental 
factors, including volition or intention, and have objects. Some models that involve more 
than eight types of consciousness allow the possibility of actualizing the subliminal mind 
devoid of everything but ultimate reality and/or that mind itself. Nevertheless, Buddhist 
thinkers diverge on the issue of whether this ultimate reality is an object or not and what 
kind of object it is. 
If we analyze the context in which Buddhist mystical experiences occur, it also becomes 
clear that they are triggered only by specific Buddhist training and conditioning. Even in 
the context of some Zen models that advocate initial awakening as sudden, this event is 
clearly mediated by certain conditioning processes that precede it, such as the contempla-
tion of kōans in Rinzai training, for example. (Mediation, of course, does not necessarily 
have to precede mystical experiences immediately, but can occur at some time earlier.) In 
terms of the aforementioned Buddhist path models in particular, even the direct realization 
of reality never stays the same and constantly evolves until one is fully enlightened; real-
izations of emptiness and types of emptiness realized will differ depending on what path 
and stage of the path one is on. This implies that even this highest type of mystical experi-
ence in Buddhism is mediated―if not at the time of its occurrence then at least prior to it. 
It goes without saying that all pure visions of the subsequent attainment are both mediated 
and have objects. 
The above discussion makes it clear that unless contextualized, analysis of (un)medi-
ated mystical experience makes little sense in Buddhism; it is greatly assisted by the mind 
and path models, especially those of conceptuality/non-conceptuality and the ten stages-five 
paths. Within the Buddhist context, the direct realization of ultimate reality is one of the 
highest expressions of mystical experience, and it also best approximates the category of 
unmediated mystical experience. Direct realization of ultimate reality and other Buddhist 
mystical experiences are mediated in terms of being preceded by conditioning processes 
that bear upon and trigger those experiences. Whether such experiences are seen as me-
diated or not, objectless or not, etc., at the time of their occurrence, depends on particu-
lar forms of Buddhism we deal with, on contextual meanings, and on descriptive strategies 
used to address those experiences. 
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59 See, for example, Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Kindness, Clarity, and Insight (Snow 
Lion Publications, 2006), 246 ff. 
60 See, for example, Rongtön Sheja Künrik (rong ston shes bya kun rig, 1367–1449), Lamp Clarify-
ing the Five Paths: Quintessential Instructions on Incorporating into Experience the Essence of All 
Excellent Words―the Perfection of Wisdom (Gsung rab thams cad kyi snying po shes rab kyi pha 
rol tu phyin pa nyams su len pa’i man ngag / lam lnga gsal sgron, Gangtok, Sikkim: Sherab Gyalt-
sen, 1979), 11 ff. For more details on these instructions discussed by the same author, see Rongtön’s 
Moonrays of Essential Points: Abridged Essence of Incorporation into Experience (Nyams su len pa’i 
rim pa snying po mdor bsdus pa gnad kyi zla zer), in The Collected Works of Rong-ston Shak-kya 
Rgyal-mtsen, vol. B, kha (Dehra Dun, India: Sakya College, 1999), 562–565, and other meditative in-
structions in the same volume. 
Shakya Chokden’s approach to Yogācāra and Madhyamaka
The previous section demonstrated that direct realization of ultimate reality and other 
uniquely Buddhist mystical experiences are seen by Buddhists as being accessible only 
through conditioning in the traditions that teach such experiences and realizations. Other-
wise, they are not treated as uniquely Buddhist, and either placed under the category of the 
“mundane paths” mentioned above or seen as simply extraneous. Nevertheless, within the 
limits of Buddhist traditions themselves, certain mystical experiences, such as the realiza-
tion of selflessness of persons (Skt. pudgalanairātmya), are often seen as being accessible 
to followers of all Buddhist systems because those systems provide efficient tools for their 
realization and because those tools do not seem to be contradictory. 
Furthermore, Buddhist thinkers do believe that certain experiences and realizations can 
be accessed by different means. Although Buddhists often make minute distinctions be-
tween different views and practices, they also propose reconciliation of at least some of 
them. They might argue, for example, that there are several ways of accessing the sub-
liminal level of consciousness, including direct realization of ultimate reality. Buddhist 
tantric systems address two distinct ways of accessing the fundamental innate luminous 
mind mentioned above: through initially dissolving subtle bodily energies into the cen-
tral energy channel (and thus replicating the death process) and through direct exposure 
to that luminous mind itself.59 In other words, it can be accessed either after coarser lev-
els of mentality have been stopped (through the dissolution of energies) or while still hav-
ing them (in the case of direct exposure). In the non-Tantric context too, one can meditate 
on emptiness or selflessness of phenomena (Skt. dharmanairātmya) either having deter-
mined it through logical reasoning outlined in Madhyamaka treatises or through quintes-
sential instructions on meditation.60 
In other contexts, Tibetan thinkers of the Sakya (Tib. (sa skya), Nyingma (Tib. rnying 
ma), and Kagyü (Tib. bka’ brgyud) traditions argue that both Svātantrika (Autonomist) and 
Prāsaṅgika (Consequentialist) systems of Madhyamaka hold valid views on ultimate real-
ity; thinkers of the Geluk tradition believe that the Prāsaṅgika view of emptiness is shared 
by Buddhist Tantra, while such thinkers as Shakya Chokden demonstrate the equal valid-
ity of Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka and Alīkākāravāda Yogācāra approaches to reality. It 
can also be argued that direct realization of reality does not necessarily have to be preceded 
by its conceptual understanding based on reasoning because tantric practitioners can access 
that realization by using alternative techniques, such as the wisdom-primordial mind em-
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61 See his Rain of Ambrosia: Extensive [Auto-]Commentary on the ‘Profound Thunder amidst the 
Clouds of the Ocean of Definitive Meaning’ (Nges don rgya mtsho sprin gyi ’brug sgra zab mo’i rg-
yas ’grel bdud rtsi’i char ’bebs), in Two Controversial Mādhyamika Treatises (Bir, India: Yashodhara 
Publications, 1996), 362 and 376 (hereafter, Rain of Ambrosia); and Appearance of the Sun Pleas-
ing All Thinkers: Discussion of the History of the Chariot Ways of [Dignāga’s]‘Sūtra on Valid Cogni-
tion’ and [its] Treatises (Tshad ma’i bstan bcos kyi shin rta’i srol rnams ji ltar ’byung ba’i tshul gtam 
du bya ba nyin mor byed pa’i snang bas dpyod ldan mtha’ dag dga’ bar byed pa), Collected Writings 
of Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan, vol. 19 (Thimphu, Bhutan: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975), 102 
(hereafter, Appearance of the Sun). 
62 See, for example, Ronald Davidson, “Atiśa’s A Lamp for the Path to Awakening,” in Buddhism in 
Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 290–301. 
63 This unique active type of compassion to all living beings that is able to inspire the desire to attain 
buddhahood solely for their sake is believed to strongly affect and eventually become united with the 
realization of ultimate reality. 
powerment (Skt. prajñājñānābhiṣeka) and the stage of self-blessings (Tib. rang byin gyis 
brlabs pa’i rim pa).61 
Restrictions nevertheless apply. For example, Buddhist thinkers argue that no progress on 
the path is possible unless one first generates renunciation of worldly existence, and no real-
izations on the Mahāyāna path are possible unless one has first developed the mind of awak-
ening (Skt. bodhicitta).62 Nor is it possible to directly realize emptiness of all phenomena 
unless one uses specific Buddhist techniques for doing so. Likewise, Buddhist tantric think-
ers argue that it is impossible to acquire genuine realizations on tantric paths without receiv-
ing tantric empowerments and instructions. The overall Buddhist position, therefore, is that 
although doors to some mystical experiences are at least partially open, not everybody can 
easily cross the threshold. 
We should also note that tantric empowerments, renunciation, logical reasoning, etc., 
are much more than simply disposable tickets one has to buy in order to board Buddhist 
vehicles to awakening. On the contrary, they comprise important parts of those vehicles. 
Cultivation of bodhicitta, for example, does not just precede but necessarily accompanies 
Mahāyāna practices, and bodhicitta is carried all the way into the state of buddhahood. Tan-
tric empowerments do not only initiate but are incorporated into tantric practice through vi-
sualizing oneself as a tantric deity accompanied on more advanced levels by self-empow-
erments (Tib. bdag ’jug). Furthermore, certain meditative states and experiences “make 
sense” only when conjoined with other practices. For example, direct realization of empti-
ness within the Mahāyāna context is believed to be brought about not by sole contemplation 
of reality, but by that contemplation in tandem with other Mahāyāna practices and states of 
mind, such as great compassion (Skt. mahākaruṇā).63 
The topic of Buddhist approaches to realization of ultimate reality is a part of this larger 
context. Although all Buddhist systems provide descriptions of reality and tools of realizing it, 
those descriptions and tools often conflict with each other and seem to be irreconcilable. As I 
have mentioned above, the dominant Mahāyāna position is that direct realization of ultimate 
reality is not mediated by words and concepts, although it is necessarily prepared by certain 
conditioning processes. In the non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism, these processes are usually 
considered to be conceptual, and consist of logical reasoning aimed at deconstructing and de-
stroying dualistic thinking. The most complicated questions to ask in this context are how con-
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64 On the details of development of Shakya Chokden’s views, see my Visions of Unity, Chap. 2, Sect. 4. 
65 The Satyākāravāda / Alīkākāravāda distinction ultimately boils down to the question of the reality of 
mental appearances. Although Yogācāras in general do not accept the existence of an external mate-
rial world, according to Satyākāravāda its appearances or “representations” (Skt. ākāra) reflected in 
consciousness have a real or true existence, because they are of one nature with the really existent 
consciousness, their creator. According to Alīkākāravāda, neither external phenomena nor their ap-
pearances and types of consciousness that reflect them really exist and are therefore false. What exists 
in reality is only primordial mind described as self-cognition or individually self-cognizing primor-
dial mind. This description is based on Shakya Chokden’s interpretation. For details, see my Visions 
of Unity, Chap. 4, Sect. 1. 
ceptual processes can trigger non-conceptual realization, what the relationship between con-
ceptuality and direct perception is, and whether different conceptual tools can trigger the same 
direct realization of reality. 
These issues are greatly clarified by Shakya Chokden, whose interpretive approach illu-
minates key elements of the widespread Buddhist approach to non-conceptual experience 
of ultimate reality: that such experience is not mediated by words and concepts when it oc-
curs; that it nevertheless has to be triggered by specific conditioning processes that usually 
involve words and concepts; and that those triggering processes can be different. His ap-
proach, therefore, is very useful for connecting analysis of the Buddhist position on this 
seminal type of mystical experience with the broader issue of mediation of mystical experi-
ences that occupies contemporary researchers of mysticism. 
More specifically, Shakya Chokden’s contribution to the question of (un)mediated mys-
tical experience lies in his unique interpretation of the nature and relationship of Yogācāra 
and Madhyamaka. In Tibet, these two rival systems are nearly universally viewed as the 
most important of all Buddhist philosophical traditions, although Madhyamaka is elevated 
to the top position. Shakya Chokden fully acknowledges differences between the two sys-
tems and provides a detailed analysis of their mutual polemical refutations of each other, 
but in his works written from 1477 onward64 he ultimately argues for their fundamen-
tal compatibility and shared vision. The majority of Tibetan thinkers treat Madhyamaka 
as synonymous with the system of  Niḥsvabhāvavāda (Proponents of Entitylessness), and 
Yogācāra as synonymous with Cittamātra (Mind Only), and further subdivide the latter into 
two systems of Alīkākāravāda (Proponents of False Representations) and Satyākāravāda 
(Proponents of True Representations).65 In contrast, Shakya Chokden accepts neither that 
Yogācāra and Cittamātra are the same system nor that Madhyamaka is limited to the sys-
tem of Niḥsvabhāvavāda only. Although he accepts the twofold division of Yogācāra into 
Alīkākāravāda and Satyākāravāda, he identifies Satyākāravāda as synonymous exclusively 
with Cittamātra, and Alīkākāravāda as a subdivision of Madhyamaka on an equal footing 
with Niḥsvabhāvavāda and surpassing Cittamātra. His unique position is that Alīkākāravāda 
is both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. 
Clarifying differences between Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda and at the same 
time showing their compatibility, he draws a sharp distinction between the views realized in 
the meditative equipoise of Mahāyāna āryas and the views conceptually determined by rea-
soning prior to meditative equipoise or described during its subsequent attainment. This dis-
tinction allows him to bring the two systems together on the level of direct realization of ul-
timate reality while keeping them distinct on the level of the conceptual approach to it. He 
shows that interpretive differences between Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda pertain to 
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66 As he puts it at the beginning of his Rain of Ambrosia, the text that most extensively treats this is-
sue: “I wish to explain the way in which there is a difference between the two systems in the modes 
of temporarily positing [their views] through reasoning, but no difference in their modes of uphold-
ing [the ultimate view] in the context of identification of the definitive meaning experienced through 
meditation” (srol gnyis po gnas skabs su rigs pas gtan la ’bebs tshul gyi khyad par yod pa dang / 
sgom pas nyams su myong bya’i nges don zhig ngos ’dzin pa’i tshe ’dzin tshul la khyad par med pa’i 
tshul bshad par ’dod pas…). Rain of Ambrosia, 390. 
67 Shakya Chokden explains: “Both [systems] are also similar in asserting that on the level of severing 
proliferations by the view within meditative equipoise, one does not take to mind any characteristics, 
and even the wisdom of individual analysis itself only has to be consumed by the fire of primordial 
mind. Nevertheless, on [the level of] subsequent attainment, when they present tenets in their own 
systems, [they differ in] accepting non-dual primordial mind or not accepting it. Therefore, due to that 
lack of difference in their modes of severing proliferations within meditative equipoise, it is not possi-
ble to distinguish between ability or non-ability to abandon predispositions of obscurations of know-
ables by the views of the two systems” (gnyis kas kyang mnyam gzhag tu lta bas spros pa gcod pa’i 
tshe mtshan ma gang yang yid la mi byed cing / so sor rtog pa’i shes rab nyid kyang ye shes kyi mes 
bsreg dgos pa nyid du bzhed par mtshungs kyang / rjes thob tu rang lugs su grub pa’i mtha’ smra ba 
na / gnyis med kyi ye shes yod par khas len pa dang / de mi len pa’o // de bas na mnyam gzhag tu 
spros pa gcod tshul la khyad par med pa de’i phyir lugs gnyis ka’i lta ba la shes sgrib kyi bag chags 
spong nus mi nus kyi khyad par dbye nus pa ma yin no). Thorough Clarification of Definitive Mean-
ing of the Five Doctrines of Maitreya (Byams chos lnga’i nges don rab tu gsal ba zhes bya ba’i 
bstan bcos), Collected Writings of Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan, vol.11 (Thimphu, Bhu-
tan: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975), 19–20. 
68 Rain of Ambrosia, 379. 
69 Ibid., 333–334.
the view of ultimate reality determined through reasoning on the conceptual level, but de-
spite those differences they provide means for accessing the same ultimate reality directly 
realized through meditative experience.66 Consequently, by following different conceptual 
approaches to ultimate reality, followers of both systems can access the same direct realiza-
tion of it. Likewise, he explains that descriptions of that realization on the level of its sub-
sequent attainment are also distinct in the two systems. Nevertheless, both are equally valid 
divisions of Madhyamaka, because both have the capacity to dispel the most subtle obscura-
tions and thereby enable the achievement of buddhahood.67 
Comparing the two systems in the context of the self-emptiness (Tib. rang stong)/other-
emptiness (Tib. gzhan stong) distinction, Shakya Chokden explains that Niḥsvabhāvavāda 
determines reality in terms of self-emptiness of all phenomena, while Alīkākāravāda does 
it in terms of other-emptiness.68 When determining the view of reality on the conceptual 
level, Niḥsvabhāvavāda treats it as a total negation of the entities of all phenomena, in-
cluding emptiness itself. In contrast to that, Alīkākāravāda selectively negates some phe-
nomena (imaginary natures, Skt. parikalpita) on the basis of other phenomena (dependent 
natures, Skt. paratantra), and preserves the entity of non-dual primordial mind (thor-
oughly established nature, Skt. pariniṣpanna), left as the remainder of that negation.69 The 
Niḥsvabhāvavāda position of self-emptiness entails the view of non-affirming negation (Skt. 
prasajyapratiṣedha), because it entails negation of all phenomena without positing anything 
in its stead. On the other hand, the Alīkākāravāda position of other-emptiness entails the 
view of affirming negation (Skt. paryudāsa), because it casts the non-dual primordial mind 
as the remainder of the negation of the object of negation. Shakya Chokden further argues 
that a non-affirming negation is an object of concepts only and therefore cannot be directly 
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70 Ocean of Scriptural Statements and Reasoning: Treasury of Ascertainment of Mahāyāna Madhya-
maka (Theg pa chen po dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho), Col-
lected Writings of Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan, vol.14 (Thimphu, Bhutan: Kunzang To-
bgey, 1975), 393; ibid., vol.15, 461; Great Path of Ambrosia of Emptiness: Explanation of Profound 
Pacification Free from Proliferations (Zab zhi spros bral gyi bshad pa stong nyid bdud rtsi’i lam po 
che), Collected Writings of Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan, vol.4 (Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-
zang Tobgey, 1975), 114; Appearance of the Sun, 85. 
71 He explains: “There are two types of reasoning negating adhering minds together with habitual tenden-
cies: the reasoning that negates grasping at objects by having negated those objects in the face of con-
ceptuality, or [the reasoning negating] only the apprehender-imaginary nature by the reason of the lack 
of being one or many” (zhen blo bag chags dang bcas pa // ’gog byed rigs pa’i rnam grangs gnyis // 
rtog ngor de yul bkag pa yis // de ’dzin ’gog pa’i rigs pa dang // yang na ’dzin pa kun btags nyid // gcig 
dang du bral rigs pas so). Precious Treasury of the Condensed Essence of the Profound and Extensive 
in Eight Dharma Sections (Zab rgya’i snying po bsdus pa rin chen gter mdzod chos tshan brgyad pa), in 
‘Hundred and Eight Dharma Sections’ Treatise (Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad pa zhes bya ba’i bstan 
bcos), Collected Writings of Gser-mdog paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan, vol. 13 (Thimphu, Bhutan: Kun-
zang Tobgey, 1975), 174. 
experienced in the meditative equipoise of Mahāyāna āryas. The affirming negation can be 
experienced directly in meditative equipoise, because the self-cognizing primordial mind is 
both an affirming negation and a functional thing (Tib. dngos po).70 
Thus, Alīkākāravādins conceptually determine through reasoning and meditate directly 
in meditative equipoise on the same primordial mind. They describe that realization after-
wards also as meditation on the primordial mind. Niḥsvabhāvavādins through reasoning ar-
rive at the non-affirming negation and afterwards claim that the non-realization of anything 
by anything is simply given the name of direct realization of emptiness. Nevertheless, both 
the Alīkākāravāda view of affirming negation and the Niḥsvabhāvavāda view of non-affirm-
ing negation are effective in terms of being able to trigger the same direct realization of ul-
timate reality. Despite differences in techniques used for accessing that realization, follow-
ers of both systems directly realize the same reality as a result of applying those techniques. 
This sameness is not damaged by the fact that Alīkākāravādins afterwards describe that re-
alization as an affirming negation while Niḥsvabhāvavādins describe it as not realizing any-
thing by anything (they cannot describe it as a non-affirming negation because that would 
entail that such realization is conceptual). 
Shakya Chokden argues that followers of both Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda are 
“destined” to directly realize the same ultimate reality. No matter which of the two systems 
one follows, she eventually will break through the thicket of conceptuality and directly expe-
rience the same non-dual primordial mind. But we also learned that Niḥsvabhāvavāda negates 
the reality of all phenomena, including the primordial mind, while Alīkākāravāda does not ne-
gate its reality. Then how can the two systems be compatible? Shakya Chokden’s answer is 
that whether their followers negate reality of primordial mind prior to meditative equipoise 
or not, they can get access to this primordial mind within meditative equipoise. This position 
raises the following question: how is it possible to negate grasping at the reality of primordial 
mind without negating it through reasoning? Shakya Chokden handles this question by argu-
ing that there are two different ways of negating grasping: using reasoning that focuses on ne-
gating the objects of grasping and using reasoning that focuses on negating the grasping it-
self.71 The first approach is used by Niḥsvabhāvavādins, the second by Alīkākāravādins. 
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72 This is how he presents them in the Rain of Ambrosia: “Honorable Candrakīrti and other 
[Niḥsvabhāvavādins] assert that without determining the object, the dharma-sphere, as self-empty, 
it is impossible to reverse thoughts that grasp at it as signs. On the other hand, honorable Asaṅga, 
commenting on Maitreya’s scriptures, [asserts that] having determined the apprehender-imaginary 
nature as self-empty, and accustomed [one’s mind to it], due to that very [process] the grasping [at 
the dharma-sphere] can subside by itself within meditative equipoise” (yul chos dbyings rang stong 
du gtan la ma phab na / de la mtshan mar ’dzin pa’i blo ldog mi nus zhes pa ni zla ba’i zhabs sogs 
kyi bzhed pa yin mod / thogs med zhabs kyis byams pa’i gzhung ’grel ba na ni / ’dzin pa kun btags 
rang stong du gtan la phab nas goms par byas pa nyid kyis mnyam gzhag tu ’dzin pa rang gi ngang 
gis zhi bar nus…). Rain of Ambrosia, 415. See also the Appearance of the Sun, vol. 19, 118–119 for 
more details. 
73 Rain of Ambrosia, 334. 
Describing the tools that negate conceptual proliferations, Niḥsvabhāvavādins ar-
gue that without negating the object, its subject cannot be negated. This is because the 
Niḥsvabhāvavāda system treats subjects and objects as dependently established. Because 
they are established in mutual dependence, they have to be negated in mutual dependence 
too. According to the Alīkākāravāda system, on the other hand, it is possible to negate 
grasping at objects by negating just subjects that grasp. One does not necessarily have to ne-
gate the objects those subjects grasp at. In other words, by negating grasping subjects, their 
grasping function will be cancelled automatically. We might think of cutting off a hand as 
an analogy: the moment it is cut off its grasping or grabbing function stops on its own ac-
cord, without unnecessary removal of objects of grabbing. In particular, it is possible to ne-
gate grasping at reality of primordial mind by negating consciousness that takes primordial 
mind as its object and grasps at it as real. Shakya Chokden treats both the Niḥsvabhāvavāda 
and Alīkākāravāda approaches as valid and argues that it is possible to abandon all obscura-
tions by following either one.72 
Highlighting this sharp distinction between Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda views 
of emptiness on the conceptual level, Shakya Chokden demonstrates that they are different 
Madhyamaka systems. In spite of that, he argues that this difference itself does not go be-
yond conceptually determined views. Even though on the conceptual level followers of the 
two types systems determine emptiness differently, both of them abandon the same prolifer-
ations and acquire the same direct realization of ultimate reality within the meditative equi-
poise of Mahāyāna āryas.73 Put in terms of mystical experience, his position is that at least 
within the limits of these two systems, Mahāyāna āryas acquire the same mystical experi-
ence of ultimate reality that is not mediated by any concepts or words at the time of its oc-
currence. This is despite the fact that it is necessarily mediated prior to its occurrence, i.e., 
prepared and triggered by different conceptual tools, and its subsequent description is also 
affected by divergent philosophical categories of the two systems. 
Conclusion and final remarks
It is clear that Shakya Chokden’s position hinges upon his basic claim that both 
Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda approaches are efficient for dispelling obstacles 
to direct realization of ultimate reality. As we have seen, he argues that it is possible to 
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negate the same obstructing concepts by focusing on either negating their referents (as 
Niḥsvabhāvavādins do) or those concepts themselves (as Alīkākāravādins do). To trans-
late this position into the “mystical language,” he claims that one can access the same 
mystical experience of reality in different ways as long as those ways are equally effec-
tive for destroying obstacles to that experience. What allows Shakya Chokden to make 
such claims? 
A crucial point to note here is that his claim of the same non-conceptual mystical experi-
ence being triggered by different conceptual processes is possible only as long as those pro-
cesses are treated as deconstructive in nature. As an example, we can think of demolishing 
a wall: whether one uses bare hands, feet, hammers, sledges, explosives, etc., as long as he 
can completely demolish it, he will achieve the same end result―disappearance of the wall 
and breaking through it to the open space it has been blocking. Likewise, as long as tech-
niques used by Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda practitioners are treated as deconstruc-
tive, and as long as it can be demonstrated that they are equally effective in destroying im-
pediments to the direct realization of reality, it can be claimed that the direct realization they 
trigger and the reality accessed through that realization are the same. 
Such claims would be unfounded were Shakya Chokden treating the processes leading 
to direct realization of reality―as well as that realization itself―as constructive, i.e., con-
sisting of building, developing, and strengthening different ideas and concepts, be they con-
cepts of ultimate reality, emptiness, primordial mind, and what not. Were he to argue that 
Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda contemplatives engage in constructing and augment-
ing discordant ideas as the means of realizing their respective versions of ultimate reality, 
how would he be able to claim that despite constructing and cultivating those different ideas 
in contemplative practice, Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda practitioners can somehow 
achieve the same realization as a result of that practice? It would be similar to claiming that 
a person who meditates on a white square and a person who meditates on a red triangle can 
achieve a vivid vision of one and the same phenomenon as a result of those meditations. 
Another example we can think of is constructing different houses with different materials, 
giving them different shapes and sizes, and painting them with different colors. To claim 
that such construction activities can somehow result in building absolutely identical houses 
would indeed be mystical! 
Note another important element of Shakya Chokden’s approach: he is far from claim-
ing that all mental impediments can be destroyed with any deconstructive technique. 
After all, is it possible to destroy all types of walls with just any tools? Of course not! 
Shakya Chokden’s position is likewise much more specific and restrictive: he is claim-
ing that in the non-tantric context only Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Alīkākāravāda tools are suf-
ficient for destroying impediments to direct realization of ultimate reality. And here he is 
not different from other Tibetan thinkers who also treat systems “lower” than Madhya-
maka as insufficient for achieving this objective because according to them those “lower” 
systems do not provide valid means for destroying impediments to that realization. In 
fact, this is one of the main reasons why Shakya Chokden works so hard to demonstrate 
in his writings that Alīkākāravāda Yogācāra is Madhyamaka and not Cittamātra: treating 
it as Cittamātra (or any other system below Madhyamaka) would immediately exclude it 
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74 See Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India and “The Mystic East” 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 175 ff. Discussing approaches of Indian religious traditions, King 
rightly argues: “All of these Asian traditions accept the role played by concepts and cultural condi-
tioning in everyday states of consciousness. Clearly, they also accept that releasing oneself from these 
conditioning factors requires cultivation through constant yogic practice… Where these traditions dif-
fer from modern Western intellectuals like Katz… is in the acknowledgement of the possibility of 
transcending one’s own personal and cultural particularity and the attainment of some final state of ul-
timate understanding… The acceptance of the reality (indeed, for these Indian traditions the central-
ity) of an unmediated and unconstructed awareness constitutes a major point of disagreement between 
mainstream Western intellectual thought and classical Asian traditions of spirituality” (ibid., 182).
from the category of those systems that provide effective means for realization of ultimate 
reality. 
The lesson we learn from Shakya Chokden, therefore, is much more nuanced than 
something along the lines of “different traditions can bring their followers to the same 
mystical experience despite the fact that they describe such experience differently.” 
Rather, his position suggests that in order to understand whether, when, and how follow-
ers of different traditions can achieve similar mystical experiences, we have to analyze 
the deconstructive processes that they utilize in contemplative practice. Were those pro-
cesses not deconstructive, any claims of common mystical experiences achieved as their 
result would be groundless. 
Consequently, besides exploring the questions of whether mystical experiences are con-
structed or not and whether they are mediated or not, we also have to explore in more de-
tail the actual processes leading to those experiences. If we want to explore similarities be-
tween different mystical traditions―including those that claim their mystical experiences 
are unmediated at the time of their occurrence―we have to analyze what their followers at-
tempt to deconstruct, what they claim to have deconstructed, and most importantly what 
tools they use to achieve that deconstruction. If it is possible to demonstrate that those tools 
are equally effective, we might go ahead and claim that despite different cultures, back-
grounds, worldviews, etc., followers of those traditions can achieve the same mystical expe-
rience. Otherwise, we might as well be satisfied to conclude that they simply have irrecon-
cilable differences and particularities. But obviously a survey of that breadth is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
The approach outlined here is, I believe, beneficial in several respects. First, it provides 
an alternative way of analyzing the issue of (un)mediated mystical experience by shifting 
our attention from the question of the possibility of such an experience to the actual tech-
niques designed to induce it. Second, it takes us beyond the boundaries of the “Western” in-
tellectual world, drawing our attention to perspectives on mystical experience developed 
by Buddhists such as Shakya Chokden who―together with numerous thinkers from other 
Asian religious traditions―concur that it is possible to have a non-conceptual, unmediated 
experience of their version of the ultimate that nonetheless has to be intentionally triggered 
by particular contemplative techniques.74 And last, but not least, it might take us beyond 
purely textual studies of mysticism to the world of field research that would consist of ob-
serving contemplative techniques practiced by followers of different traditions, discussing 
with them their experience of relationship between those contemplative processes and their 
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intended results, and perhaps even personally participating in those practices as a means of 
personal intimate understanding. 
This article was primarily concerned with what Buddhists themselves have to say 
about―and contribute to―the question of (un)mediated mystical experience. It is self-
evident that similar to varieties of mystical experiences that emerge as a result of specific 
conditioning used in other religions, in Buddhism too there are reported different mysti-
cal experiences that are conditioned by uniquely Buddhist techniques. The problematic 
question raised in this article was whether Buddhism allows for unmediated mystical ex-
periences. In my analysis of the processes involved in the key Buddhist mystical experi-
ence―direct realization of ultimate reality―I argued that most Buddhist thinkers (rep-
resented in this paper by Shakya Chokden) treat this experience as unmediated by words 
and concepts at the time of its occurrence. Nevertheless, such realization is seen as neces-
sarily mediated in terms of being triggered by preceding conditioning processes that are 
uniquely Buddhist in character. 
Buddhists diverge in their interpretations of the nature of ultimate reality and the pro-
cesses leading to its realization. The main question targeted throughout this article was 
whether, despite that diversity, Buddhism allows for the same mystical experience to be 
triggered by different conditioning processes. My analysis of Shakya Chokden’s position 
demonstrated that according to at least some thinkers this is possible, but only in limited 
cases, such as those of Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda. 
This article was not concerned with possible commonalities between Buddhist and non-
Buddhist mystical experiences in general (except for the category of “mundane paths” 
that Buddhists take as common to themselves and some groups of non-Buddhist contem-
platives). Analysis of the direct realization of ultimate reality in terms of Buddhist mind 
and path models demonstrates that it is necessarily triggered by uniquely Buddhist means. 
In contrast to the Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda approaches addressed above, we 
cannot claim the sameness of this particular mystical experience in Buddhism and other 
religions. The reason is that the Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda systems rely on con-
ditioning processes based on reasoning aimed at the deconstruction of concepts; as long 
as it can be demonstrated that their reasoning is equally valid, it is also possible to claim 
that it can eventually bring about the same mystical experience―the direct realization of 
ultimate reality. This is clearly not the case in other religious systems that provide neither 
such reasoning nor conditioning processes based on that reasoning. And even in the Bud-
dhist context, such an option is open within the narrow confines of some Mahāyāna tradi-
tions only. 
Nevertheless, this research might be profitably extended by exploring whether certain 
specific practitioners within certain Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions might share at 
least some types of mystical experience. It is too early to anticipate any specific results at 
this point. But even if such research demonstrates more differences than similarities, more 
plurality than commonality between the mystical experiences of different traditions, that 
finding itself might be significant and serve an important purpose. 
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